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INSURANCE-EFFECT OF CONTRACT TO REBUILD
UPON GARNISHEES OF INSURED
After reserving a life estate to herself, Willie Lytton Johnson
conveyed a 152 acre tract of land to her son, Ogden C. Johnson
and Maggie H. Johnson, his wife, "for and during their natural
lives, and the life of the survivor thereof, with remainder in fee"
to their children. In addition to the consideration of $1 and the
promise to pay all taxes on the land during the life of the grantor
mentioned in the deed, Ogden and his wife also promised to pay
his mother for the use of her life estate; to pay the insurance
premiums then in effect on the property; and, in case of loss or
damage by fire or other causes insured against, to apply the in-
surance proceeds to the repair or restoration of the property
damaged or destroyed. Sometime later, the clause, "Ogden C.
Johnson, as his interest may appear," was added to the beneficiary
clause of the insurance policy which previously had read only
"Willie Lytton Johnson, Administratrix of W. J. Johnson." This
was upon advice of the insurance company concerned. The
dwelling house on the tract, which was insured for $4,000,
later burned. A judgment creditor of Ogden C. Johnson brought
garnishment proceedings against the insurance company to sub-
ject the proceeds of the fire insurance to the payment of his judg-
ment of $468. The trial court dismissed the case and the Su-
preme Court of Appeals granted a writ of error. Upon appeal,
held, affirmed. "By virtue of this agreement, the insurance pro-
ceeds in this case stand in the place of the destroyed property,
and neither Ogden C. Johnson, the judgment debtor, nor any of
the other persons whose interest in the property was insured are
individually entitled to these proceeds." Lynch v. Johnson, 196
Va. 516, 524, 84 S.E.2d 419, 424 (1954).
The Court also said that even if it be assumed Ogden C.
Johnson was entitled to some part of the proceeds, the evidence
did not establish what amount was due him, the Court recogniz-
ing the intricate problems involved in determining the interest
of one having only a joint life estate with the right of survival
subject to a prior life estate on which he holds a joint lease.
A contract of insurance is a personal contract, and,. in the
absence of words indicating a contrary intent, inures to the
benefit of the party with whom it is made, and this is true even
though the insured has only a qualified estate in the property
covered by the policy.' It is not a contract in rem2 and it does not
run with the insured property.3 The general rule with respect
to the proceeds of property insurance is that contingent, uncer-
tain, and speculative interests cannot be attached.4 With re-
spect to the insurance company having the option to rebuild, it
is generally held that until the option to rebuild is either exer-
cised or waived, a contingency exists which prevents the insur-
ance company being garnisheed.5 If the option to rebuild is exer-
cised by the insurer, then no garnishment can lie as there is no
indebtedness owed by the insurer to the insured subject to
garnishment.6
By virtue of this decision by the Court, would it be advan-
tageous to incorporate such a provision, i.e., the insurance pro-
ceeds to be used for the restoration of the destroyed premises,
in all contracts involving not only life tenant-remainderman, but
leasee-leasor, mortgagee-mortgagor, possibly landlord-tenant, and
other similar type arrangements whereby two or more parties
have insurable interests in common property? Certainly it would
permit the entire proceeds to be used for the reconstruction of
the destroyed property without the proceeds being diminished
by garnishment as was attempted in the present case.
This method or plan would surely go a long way towards
'placing the concerned parties, as well as lien creditors whose
liens upon the destroyed property would not follow to the pro-
ceeds,7 in the same position they occupied before the loss oc-
curred. This is, of course, based on the supposition that the pro-
ceeds will cover the cost of rebuilding or the involved parties
can reach some agreement as to their shares of the contribution if
the proceeds are not suffcient to cover the rebuilding costs.
1 Allemannia Fire Ins. Co. v. Winding Gulf Collieries, 60 F.Supp. 65 (S.D.W.Va.
1945); 10 Michie's Jurisprudence 302 (1950).2 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cu well, 62 S.W.2d 100 (Tex.Com.App. 1933;
see 44 C.J.S. 933 (1945) for further discussion.
544 C.J.S. 934 (194S); 5 Appleman, I.mrasc Law and Practice, Ch. 148 (1942); see
Annot., 66 A.L.R. 864 (130).
'West Florida Grocery Co. v. Totonia Fire Ins. Co., 74 Fla. 220, 77 So. 209 (1917);
see Annot., 38 A.L.R. 1072 (1925).
54 Am.Jur., Attachment and Garnishment §301 (1936).
a Ibid.
146 C.J.S. 32 (1946).
' However, assuming the situation where neither party wishes
to rebuild or an additional contribution is needed and the parties
cannot arrive at their respective shares of this contribution, what
then? It would appear logical to assume that their contract to
use the proceeds to rebuild had been waived by mutual consent,
and it would then be incumbent upon the parties to determine
their respective interests in the proceeds. This could be done by
mutual agreement, use of tables, or petitioning a court of equity
if the parties are unable to arrive at a satisfactory settlement.
The question naturally arises now whether this idea would
not allow the parties involved to play fast and loose with debtors
such as the one involved in the present case. Actually it gives
lien creditors more protection than they have now because the
contract to rebuild will prevail unless both (or all, as the case
may be) parties agree not to rebuild. It does not necessarily fol-
low that a mere fortuitous event such as a fire loss should have
the effect of providing a garnisheeable fund in the hands of the
insurer to the detriment of lien creditors and the debtor, who
is carrying insurance not only to protect his investment but also
to provide a fund with which he can rebuild. It would seem
the more equitable solution would be to allow the proceeds to
stand in place of the destroyed property and be used to restore
all parties concerned to their former position before the loss.
One further problem remains and that is the situation where
there is a contract to rebuild, a judgment creditor, and after the
insurance company settles the claim the parties decide not to
rebuild. This situation would appear to give an unscrupulous
debtor an excellent chance to defraud his judgment creditors.
This could probably be remedied by saying that the persons
:covered by the "as their interests may appear" clause were trus-
tees of the proceeds. Upon notification by the judgment creditor
that except for the contract to rebuild the debtor's interest could
be garnisheed in the hands of the insurer, the trustees are under
a duty to notify the creditor in order that he might start pro-
ceedings to reach this fund, part of which belongs to his debtor.
It would appear that the use of this type of contract to use
the insurance proceeds to rebuild would achieve for all intents
and purposes practically the same effect as the doctrine of equi-
table conversion or the idea that the proceeds should stand in
place of the destroyed property which a few courts believe to be
the better view as to insurance proceeds 8
The Court bolsters its opinion by further saying that no evi-
dence was brought forth as to the amount due Ogden C. John-
son, the debtor, in the trial court, citing several Virginia cases9
to the effect that under Virginia statutes10 the claim of the debtor
must be certain and absolute because it is not the duty of a
court of law to determine the debtor's interest, that being the
duty of a court of equity. This might have the effect of weaken-
ing the case to some extent as a precedent because it raises the
problem that if the evidence does establish the debtor's interest
definitely a future court could attempt to distinguish that case
from the present one on the ground that this case went off mainly
on the point of indefiniteness rather than on the point of the con-
tract to rebuild.
In summary, there is much to be said for the use of this type
contract in those situations where more than one person has an
interest in the same property and it is thought desirable to have
one person insure for all interested parties.
It is submitted that the result is undoubtedly the proper one,
and it is further submitted that the contract to rebuild should be
the basis of the decision. This not only permits the concerned
parties to agree in advance as to the application of the proceeds,
but it goes a long way towards maintaining the status quo of all
parties before the fortuitous event.
William Boys Harman, Jr.
8 See 19 Va.L.Rev. 282 (1933) for further discussion why proceeds of fire insurance
policy should be treated as substitute for destroyed property, particularly in the life
tenant-remainderman situation.
0 Rollo v. Andes Ins Co 23 Gratt. 509, 64 Va. 509 (1873); Barnes v. American Ferti-
lizer Co., 144 Va. 69, 130 S.E. 902 (1925); Ayres v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co.,
172 Va. 383, 2 S.E.2d 303 (1939).
10 See Va. Code §8-519 through §8-577 (1950, Supp. 1954), in particular 8-524, §8-52S,
and §8-550 through §8-553.
